Observed tradeoffs between monetary returns and fatality risk identify estimates of the value of a statistical life (VSL), which inform public policy and quantify preferences for environmental quality, health and safety. To date, few investigations have estimated the VSL associated with tradeoffs between returns from natural resource extraction activities and the fatality risks they involve. Understanding these tradeoffs (and the VSL that they imply) may be used to inform resource management policy and safety regulations, as well as our general understanding of the value of life. By modeling a commercial fishing captain's choice to fish or not, conditional on the observed risk, this research investigates these topics using data from the Alaskan red king crab and snow crab fisheries. Using weather conditions and policy variables as instruments, our estimates of the mean VSL range from $4.20M to $4.86M (depending on the modeling assumption and fishery analyzed) and are robust to the incorporation of heterogeneous preferences. Furthermore, given the unique nature of the data we are able to conduct an intra-vessel comparison of the VSL and conclude that for roughly 92% of the fishermen observed in the data set their VSL estimates are stable across fisheries.
I. Introduction
Society often faces choices that involve tradeoffs between physical risk and pecuniary returns, and our decisions reveal our willingness to trade money for the risk of physical harm (Ashenfelter 2006) .
1 "The ratio of the wealth we are willing to accept in exchange for a small change in the probability of a fatality is expressed in units of 'dollars per death,' or the dollar value of a fatality. It is for this reason that this tradeoff is often called the value of a 'statistical' life" (Ashenfelter 2006, pC10) . To date, little attention has been paid to the empirical investigation of the value of a statistical life (VSL) in high-risk natural resource extraction industries. 2 This research investigates this topic using a unique data set on fishing behavior in the Alaskan crab fisheries, recently popularized as "The Deadliest Catch," in a period during which two exogenous policy changes have altered the risks within the fishery.
In 2006 commercial fishing became the riskiest occupation in the United States. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), the fatality rate for fishermen was 141.7/100,000 workers, which is substantially greater than the national average of 3.9/100,000 workers (BLS 2006) . Commercial fishing risk is a direct function of the common-pool nature of the resource which often generates a "race for fish" within fisheries. That is, if a fishery is managed with a fishery-wide total allowable catch (TAC), it creates incentives for fishermen to fish as quickly as possible before the TAC is reached and the fishery is closed for the season. When fisheries are managed in this way, the race may generate risky behavior on the part of the participants, and we typically observe rent dissipation and excess capacity within the fishery relative to the socially optimal level (Cheung 1970; Gordon 1954; Smith 1968 Smith , 1969 . Although many fisheries can be characterized as a regulated open-access fishery (Homans and Wilen 1997) because they possess a fishery wide total allowable catch (TAC) and licenses that may not be obtainable by all (e.g., license limitation program), rent dissipation is still a dominate feature as fishermen "race for fish"
generating a "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin 1968 ).
The use of property rights to mitigate the tragedy of the commons has proven successful in a number of different natural resource environments (Hannesson 2004; Libecap 2006; Neher et al. 1989 ).
Aside from increasing economic efficiency, property rights substantially reduce the incentive to race. If such behavior is positively correlated with risk, the creation of property rights in fisheries may reduce the inherent risks within the fishery. 3 With mitigation of these risks in mind, two policy changes in the 1 The theoretical foundation for the risk-wealth trade off and the Hicksian compensation variation were initially derived by Jones-Lee (1974) . 2 Thaler and Rosen (1976) did utilize fishermen in their pioneering hedonic wage research. However, the fatality risk rate used was 19/100,000 which is substantially different than current measures of the fatality risk rate in fisheries. 3 Within the Alaskan crab fisheries it is possible that risks may have increased with the adoption of property rights as vessels restructured their capital inputs (i.e., carrying more crab pots) to accommodate the larger vessel-specific annual catch rates. However, determining the degree to which changes in capital impacted vessel-specific risk is beyond the scope of this research.
Alaskan crab fisheries have been recently enacted: 1) the United States Coast Guard (USCG) Pre-Season
Boarding Program and 2) the transition to property rights management under the Bering Sea and Aleutian
Island (BSAI) Crab Rationalization Program (BCRP). These programs affect behavior and risk in the
Alaskan red king crab fishery and are, hence, sources of exogenous variability which we use as instruments to identify and estimate the VSL. We also employ daily variation in weather conditions to the same end. Our approach is in the spirit of Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) , but our particular data set possess features that make it ideally suited for such an analysis and that allow us to investigate some additional concepts related to the VSL. These issues are discussed throughout the paper.
Valuing health and life as a commodity can be troubling because "we can not produce life years directly or buy them in any market. Goods that can not be produced or sold often become priceless through a natural process that leads to independent utility considerations, great concerns for equity, probing discussions of obligations to the future, and assertions that these goods shall not be allocated through the market" (Fuchs and Zeckhauser 1987, p267) . Therefore, the only way the value of life can be estimated is using indirect methods. Viscusi (1993) outlines three indirect methods that can be used to estimate the VSL: 1) survey methods, 2) risk trade-offs inside of the labor market, and 3) risk trade-offs outside the labor market. Survey methods allow researchers to consider a broad spectrum of risk profiles
and not just those observed within the environment or labor markets. These methods have been used to investigate the mortality risks associated with pesticide use (Evans and Viscusi 1991; Viscusi et al. 1987 ), respiratory ailments (Viscusi et al. 1991; Krupnick and Cropper 1992) , the effect of age on the VSL (Krupnick 2007) , and traffic safety (Hultkrantz 2006) , to cite a few. Risk trade-offs in the labor market are traditionally investigated using hedonic wage decomposition models (Rosen 1986; Thaler and Rosen 1976) , which regress observed wages on the work related fatality rate with additional control variables for job-and agent-specific characteristics. Hedonic wage decomposition models have been used extensively in the literature; Viscusi and Aldy (2003) cite over 60 different studies that have utilized this method to estimate the VSL. However, there are a number of empirical issues that may bias the VSL estimates within hedonic wage decomposition models. The three most commonly cited are measurement error, omitted variable bias, and the endogeneity of fatality risk (Black and Kniesner 2003; Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004; Ashenfelter 2006; Kniesner et al. 2006 ). Due to these shortcomings, this research uses observed non-labor market risk tradeoffs to estimate the VSL.
Measuring the implied VSL outside of the labor market uses the theory of consumer behavior and observed decisions to investigate individuals' money-risk tradeoffs. The earliest investigations focused on the implied VSL resulting from highway speeding (Ghosh et al. 1975 ) and the use of seat belts (Blomquist 1979) . Since then, there have been investigations into: revealed willingness to pay to avoid hazardous waste sites and pollution using property values (Gayer et al. 2000; Portney 1981) , automobile accidents using data on new automobile prices (Atkinson and Halverson 1990) , and vehicle safety and fuel economy standards (Dreyfus and Viscusi 1995) . The primary difference between studies based on the non-labor market data and labor market data is that in the former the implied risk-money trade-off the consumer faces is directly observed whereas in the later it is decomposed into a risk-wage premium.
Therefore, our approach is based on non-labor market data.
Our approach, based on the captain's decision to fish or not on a given day, estimates their marginal rate of substitution (MRS) for fatality risk and economic reward, which is converted to a VSL by multiplying the MRS by the ratio of observed revenues to fatality risk faced by each vessel. We then calculate an average VSL for the fishery. This is similar to the approach of Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) who examine the adoption of higher speed limits on rural interstate highways. We estimate our model using data from the Alaskan red king crab and snow crab fisheries over the years 1997-2007.
Furthermore, we correct for three important econometric issues which may bias VSL estimates in general:
the endogeneity of risk, sample selection bias (Ashenfelter 2006) and heterogeneity in decision agents (Shogren and Stamland 2002) . To control for the endogeneity of risk we employ the two policy changes and contemporaneous weather conditions as instruments for daily fatality risks. Given that our estimates of the VSL are only observed for those fishermen who decide to fish on a given day, our estimates of the VSL are subject to sample selection bias and represent an upper bound on the true VSL. To correct for this we conduct a two-stage Heckman sample selection model in the spirit of Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) and Ashenfelther (2006) to estimate the true underlying VSL in each fishery. Finally to account for heterogeneity in the decision agent's ability to cope with the inherent risks in the fishery as well as their earnings potential, we estimate a finite mixture model using vessel-specific information to define their vessel type.
Our empirical analysis yields VSL estimates that lie between $4.20M and $4.86M, depending on the model estimated. These estimates are stable across the two main fisheries in which crab fishermen participate, the Alaskan red king crab and snow crab fisheries, and are robust to the modeling of heterogeneous risk-return tradeoffs. Furthermore, using the unique nature of the decision environment, we are able to conduct an intra-vessel comparison of their individual VSLs implied by their revealed behavior in the two fisheries studied. Our comparison illustrates that for roughly 92% of the fishermen participating in both fisheries studied their implied VSLs with each fishery are not statistically different from each other. This finding is remarkably novel because, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that researchers have been able to conduct an intra-agent VSL analysis.
In the following section we provide a general discussion of Alaskan crab fisheries, introduce our data, and provide a descriptive discussion of how policy changes have effected risk, revenues, capital utilization, and crew size in the fisheries. Section III outlines our modeling approach and discusses our VSL results with and without heterogeneous vessel behavior. Finally, Section IV summarizes and suggest some additional avenues for research in this area.
II. Fishery and Data Description
With their high fatality rates, the Alaskan crab fisheries have long been recognized as one of the riskiest occupations. For the most part this is due to the seasons during which these fisheries are executed (late fall for red king crab and winter for snow crab). Fishermen battle adverse seas and inclement weather to harvest crab. During the time period studied (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) fisheries shifted from a limited-entry common-pool fishery to a rights-based fishery in which individual transferable quotas were allocated based on historic catch levels. Our a priori expectations regarding the impacts of these policies is that they both reduced the risks present in the fishery (holding weather constant). The following section is a brief discussion of the Alaskan crab fisheries and these policies.
Our purpose is not to evaluate the effectiveness of these programs in mitigating risk in the fishery. Our purpose is simply to argue that these programs are valid instruments for fatality risk in estimating the VSL.
Fatality rates in the Alaskan crab fisheries have historically been among the highest recorded for any fishery across the globe. Figure 1 plots the annual fatality rates per a 100,000 workers for all of Alaska and for Alaskan crab fisheries over the years 1990-2007 with vertical lines indicating the timing of the USCG Pre-Season Boarding Program and the BCRP. 6 Prior to the inception of these programs, fatality rates were nearly five-times the average fatality rate in all of Alaska (the "overall" rate includes crab fatalities). Following these programs fatality rates dropped by nearly two-thirds and the annual crab fatality rates fell more in line with the average fatality rates for all Alaskan fisheries. Thus, these programs seem to have affected risk in the fishery and are excellent sources of exogenous variability. Just prior to the inception of the BCRP, the fatality rates increased substantially within the Alaskan crab 4 Prior to the time period studied, the Commercial Vessel Safety Act was passed in 1988, which established the initial safety requirements for commercial fishing vessels (Sorum 2003) . However, given that this did not occur during the time period studied we have elected to not discuss this policy in detail. 5 We would like to thank Jennifer Lincoln of NIOSH, Alaska Field Station and Charlie Medlicott from the United States Coast Guard, Dutch Harbor for providing this information on the USCG Pre-Season Boarding Operations. 6 Source data used in Figure 1 which awarded them a fraction of the seasonal total allowable catch (TAC) and processors received individual processor quota (IPQ) which awarded them the rights to process a given percentage of the TAC. The final group allocated quota were the local communities who received community development quota (CDQ) which consisted of approximately 10% of the seasonal TAC (NOAA 2007) . The allocation of both ITQs and IPQs was enacted in an attempt to address concerns over the market power that either the processors or harvesters might possess if all the quota were allocated to only one of the these groups (Anderson 1991; Clark and Munroe 1980; Matulich et al. 1996; Matulich and Sever 1999) . The BCRP allocated quota shares to all crab fisheries in the BSAI. In each of the sub-fisheries fishermen formed harvester cooperatives to aggregate ITQs aboard vessels and to allocate the harvesting decisions among the participating vessels within the cooperative in the post-BCRP period. This research will focus on the species being targeted during the two primary fishing seasons in the BSAI, the fall season beginning in mid-October and the winter season beginning in mid-January. In the fall season the target species is king crab (Paralithodes camtschaticus and P. playpus), dominated primarily by red king crab (Paralithodes camtschaticus). In the winter season there are two target species, snow crab (Chionoecetes opilio) and tanner crab (C. biardi) with snow crab being the dominate species by catch volume. 8 Throughout the paper we will refer to the fall season as the red king crab fishery and the winter season as the snow crab fishery.
The formation of cooperatives facilitated the reduction in physical capital employed within the fishery, which had accrued to a high level in the "race for fish" era (prior to the BCRP), and it had a dramatic effect on both the number of active fishing vessels and the length of the fishing season. Figure 2 shows the number of vessels participating in each fishery by year, and the days fished each year. As is evident in the figure, season length (days fished) and the number of vessels fishing are inversely related,
which is precisely what would be expected given the prevailing fishery conditions prior to rationalization. the number of vessels (the first higher then lower curve) dramatically decreased in both fisheries, while season length increased (the first lower then higher curve). Although the number of vessels dramatically decreased following the BCRP, a direct result of the cooperatives, this does not imply that the total amount of fishing effort fell. In raw numbers labor participation fell dramatically but when controlling for the length of the season the full-time equivalence (FTE) of effort remained relatively stable. Figure 3 shows the total FTE employment rates by year. Given that the season lengths were short prior to rationalization (due to the "race") and that fishermen are exposed to risk the entire time they are on board the vessel, we constructed our FTE measure as the total number of days fished for each vessel and individuals employed (variable capital), but an increase in the utilization and duration of employment for the remaining vessels and crew.
One of the arguments for implementing the BCRP was that it would increase the safety of fishermen by eliminating the "race for fish" that prevailed in this fishery (NOAA 2006) . 9 The safety argument hinges 10 on the fact that weather-related vessel instability is the leading cause of vessel accidents and death within the Alaskan crab fishery (Lincoln and Conway 1999; Lucas and Lincoln 2007) 9 The objectives of the BSAI Crab Rationalization Program are outlined on the National Marine Fisheries Service's website. The link is http://www.fakr.noaa.gov/sustainablefisheries/crab/rat/progfaq.htm#wicr . 10 Another safety-related argument is that crew members may no longer have to fish around the clock as they had to do to compete in a race-for-fish scenario, which creates extreme fatigue and increase the likelihood of accidents. However, as we discuss later, the reduction in crew fatigue and fishing pace has yet to fully materialize. This is likely due to a continued desire to minimize days at sea (which are costly), increased catch and quota levels by the vessels that continue to fish, and persistence of the work ethic of individuals who have been historically employed largely because of their ability to work fast for long periods of time.
and that fisherman could now afford to elect to not fish on high-risk days (since their catches are now secured through property rights). Under the BCRP, captains may be more inclined to wait for good fishing weather because they are guaranteed a pre-specified quantity of crab, their ITQ. This would tend to reduce the number of tipping and capsized vessels and improve the on-deck work environment, preventing individuals from being swept overboard, and the risk of death and injury within the fishery.
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However, it is possible that the program would generate a fleet restructuring (see Figure 2 ) and concentration of quota (and thus fishing pots) aboard vessels that may generate a new suite of risks resulting in an unpredictable net change in risk (Springer 2006) . In addition, delivery contracts between vessels and processing plants still exist and may pressure a captain to catch a pre-specified delivery quantity by a certain date (effectively a race for fish).
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To conduct this analysis we use data from a number of sources. The vessel behavior data were obtained from the National Marine Fisheries Service and contains the vessel fish ticket data for all vessels that participated within the red king crab and snow crab fisheries for the years 1996-2007. 13 The fish ticket contains information on the date a vessel left port to begin fishing, the date they returned to offload their catch, the port at which they landed their catch, the amount landed, the price per pound received for their catch, and the gross revenues earned on the trip. To obtain information on the vessel's physical capital structure (i.e., vessel length, net-tonnage, horsepower, fuel, hold capacity etc.) we collected data from the state vessel registration files. Data on the number of crew members aboard the vessel as well as the share of gross revenues received by the captain and crew were obtained from the NMFS Economic Data Reports (EDR). 14 The fatality rate data were obtained from the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, Alaska Field Station and indicates the date the fatality occurred, the location within the BSAI, the cause of the fatality, and the vessel on which the fatality occurred. This information is used to construct fishery-specific daily moving averages of the fatality rate using one-year moving averages.
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For a more detailed discussion of the data utilized and variable construction see Appendix A.1.
11 Roughly 27% of the fatalities that occurred within the Alaskan crab fisheries are a result of being swept overboard. 12 We do not have information on delivery contracts because this information is retained by each individual processor and they are not required to report their delivery contracts to management (i.e., NMFS). 13 Data for 1996 was used to initiate the data used in the analysis and we can not use data prior to 1996 because the red king crab fishery was closed in 1994 and 1995. 14 The EDR data was recorded in 1998, 2001, [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] . For those years in which the EDR data was not collected we imputed the pre-rationalization specific EDR values as all post-rationalization data is present. 15 Alternative moving averages were investigated as well (2-year and 3-year) which generated similar profiles of risk. Because of this, as well as our desire to use as many years of data as possible prior to the USCG Pre-Season Boarding Program, we elected to use a 1-year moving average with data from 1996 used to initiate the 1997 values. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the two crab fisheries broken down by pre-and postrationalization (BCRP) periods. 16 Across both pre-and post-rationalization periods, the mean revenues within the red king crab fishery are roughly twice what they are in the snow crab fishery. This difference is primarily due to the difference in the ex-vessel price recorded in each fishery. Specifically, the mean ex-vessel price recorded in the red king crab fishery was $5.19 per a pound (2007 $s), whereas it was $1.27 per a pound (2007 $s) in the snow crab fishery. The average trip length doesn't vary within the snow crab fishery across pre-and post-rationalization periods, where as it does within the red king crab fishery. The shortened average trip length observed in the red king crab fishery prior to the BCRP is primarily due to the temporal constraint imposed by the shortened season, whereas the averages observed in other time periods reflect the capital limitations (e.g., filling the live hold, described below) of the vessels participating in the fishery. Mean trip length illustrates another pre-rationalization timing issue within the red king crab fishery, the length of time a vessel is moored waiting to offload their catch. The maximum reported trip lengths are longer than the actual fishery openings and this is due to boats being backlogged at port at the end of the season waiting to offload their catch. Crab can live for an extended period of time in the live holds, and vessels often wait at port to offload. However, should the vessels wait too long, crab will be begin to die and fishermen will incur a "dead-loss" which can substantially reduce their trip revenues. Because waiting at the dock will directly influence the trip revenues, but not fatality risk exposure, we truncate the trip length for all trip tickets that report landings two days beyond a fishery closure to account for the time fishermen may spend getting back to port if they are on the fishing grounds when the closure occurs.
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Another notable phenomenon in Table 1 is that fixed capital structure is heterogeneous. Vessel length, horsepower, and net-tonnage vary substantially across the fleet. However, the most notable and production-relevant form of heterogeneity is the vessel hold capacity (reflecting the volume of the tanks in which live crab are stored), which possesses a standard deviation slightly below its mean in all cases.
This heterogeneity in fixed capital will be utilized in the empirical model to help explain the intra-fleet differences in revenues. Comparing the capital structure between pre-and post-rationalization periods, a number of interesting changes occurred. In both fisheries there was a modest increase in the mean hold capacity in the post-rationalization era, indicating that vessels that had lower live storage capacities were less likely to be fished by the cooperative. However, due to the high standard deviations, these means are not statistically different from each other. Another meaningful pre-and post-rationalization change in Table 1 is in landings per vessel (Total Lbs. (yr.)), expressed in annual pounds of crab delivered to 16 We do not break down the descriptive statistics into pre-and post-USCG Pre-Season Boarding Program because this policy did not have any effect on the capital structure or season length. 17 Anecdotally, our dock interviews of captains and crew members participating in these fisheries supports this data assumption.
processors. Given that quota was individually allocated to vessels that then formed cooperatives for the execution of the fishery, many of the vessels in the cooperatives fished for more than their quota allocation (while other vessels sat idle and were paid royalties for their quota). Calculating the total landings for each active vessel in the fleet following the BCRP, we see a fair degree of heterogeneity in catch volume. However, the statistics do show that (for the most part) vessels participating in these fisheries substantially increased their landings by several orders of magnitude after rationalization. To investigate this further we calculated the ratio of each vessel's pre-rationalization landings for the three years prior to the BCRP to their post-rationalization landings, conditional on actively fishing in all years following the BCRP, the average ratio was 3.03 and 1.96 in the red king and snow crab fisheries respectively. 18 Given that vessels were awarded quota based on historical catch rates, this indicates that those vessels that participated in the post-rationalization era executed a cooperative consolidated IHQ that was between two and three times their own individual IHQ allocation. This is consistent with the contraction in capital utilization within these fishery during this time period (see Figure 2 ).
III. Empirical Model
To estimate the VSL we employ an empirical framework similar to that used by Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) 
Estimating
To recover our initial estimates of the vessel-specific tradeoffs being made within the red king and snow crab fisheries we estimate an earnings regression to recover a captain's marginal rate of substitution for risk. Using the fish ticket data we approximate the average daily gross revenues obtained per vessel per 18 We estimated this ratio using only those vessels that fished in all years following the BCRP to account for the temporal adjustment in the capital restructuring and cooperative formation following rationalization.
fishing trip. 19 That is, € R itf is total net revenues (to captain and crew) for each fishing trip divided by the number of days for that trip. Therefore we are assuming that over the course of a fishing trip the catch per day is the same. As such, the daily revenues for each vessel do not vary within a trip but do vary across trips. Ideally we would determine what revenues were obtained for each vessel on each day, but we do not observe daily production data for all vessels. Therefore, we construct daily revenue estimates by apportioning trip revenues across days fished, which may introduce some estimation bias. Fish ticket data only contain gross revenues. To convert the gross revenues to net revenues received by the captain and the crew, the EDR data was used to calculate vessel-specific shares of the gross revenues allocated to the captain and crew respectively. Given that all are on the vessel at the time of fishing the two are added together to construct € R itf . In the pre-rationalization period roughly 38.2% and 36.6% of the gross revenues were allocated to the captain and crew in the red king crab and snow crab fisheries respectively.
This changed to roughly 23.9% in both fisheries following rationalization. The changes in the pre-and post-rationalization shares is primarily due to the fact that many active fishermen following rationalization paid a lease rate on the quota they fished for their other cooperative members, which predominately reduces the take home pay to the crew and captain. The regression model we estimate for each fishery is,
The vessel specific variables, , and are vessel length, engine horsepower and hold capacity, respectively, which are the fixed production inputs. The dummy variable
indicates takes a value of 1 whenever one of the three fixed inputs is unobserved. 20 The policy dummy for the snow crab fishery. The price variable is the recorded ex-vessel price received by the vessel at the 19 The revenues per day are in thousands of dollars and converted to 2007 dollars using the consumer price index (CPI). A "trip" as defined in the analysis results from union of all overlapping fish tickets a vessel possesses within a given year, with the union of the revenues defining the total "trip" revenues. By construction this may join smaller trips into a larger "master" trip but given the limitations of the data we were forced to utilize this method. As it is the mean "trip" length used in the analysis is similar to that reported in Table 1 , which uses the raw fish ticket data. See Appendix A.1 for more detail. 20 This only affects a very small portion of the data set. Fixed input-specific dummy variables were also experimented with, but this caused some convergence problems and we elected to use a singular dummy variable.
processor at the time the fish was landed. This is used to control for the price effects on the average daily revenues. The variable € GHL tf is the gross harvest limit for each fishery in a given year, which is set at a we have elected to retain this fatality in our data set for two primary reasons: (1) ceteris paribus, removing these fatalities would bias our VSL estimates downward 21 , and (2) our dock side interviews of fishermen participating in this fishery indicated that these fishermen were highly cognizant of these fatalities.
One assumption of this model is that the captain cares for the welfare of his/her crew as well as herself in their risk-return tradeoff. That is, captains value their lives as equal to the value of a crew member's life. (If not, there would be separate MRS coefficients for captain and crew in equation 1.)
Based on this specification, a consistent estimate of (the sample-selection upper bound on the VSL) is the product of a consistent estimate of and some measure of expected revenues, divided by some measure of expected fatalities. For example, using our regression results we estimate a daily, vessel-
is a consistent estimate of the MRS. 22 One important limitation of this construction, and for most VSL studies, is that the measure of a captain's value of statistical life 21 The upward bias was confirmed in our preliminary regression analysis when we removed these fatalities from our data set. The VSL estimates were roughly $1M larger, depending on the modeling assumption, than those illustrated for the snow crab fishery within this paper. 22 We do not contend that a captain's VSL is changing daily and ultimately report average VSL over time and vessels. However, we do not impose the time-invariant assumption ex ante.
depends explicitly on the ratio of returns to fatalities. 23 Holding a vessel captain's marginal rate of substitution and the risk profile constant, a reduction in the daily returns will also reduce the implied VSL for the vessel (as the captain took on a given amount of risk for less compensation). However, the opposite holds true for days with high returns, and the goal of the model is to estimate the average VSL for the prevailing risks and returns observed in the fishery. This said, in subsequent section we will discuss in more detail the standard deviation of our daily, vessel-specific VSL measures as they reflect the degree of variability in our VSL estimates.
Within this decision environment, it is difficult to believe that the risks, € f tf , are exogenous. That is, it is the decision of a captain to fish or not to fish that explicitly determines the risk that she (and the crew) faces. If she elects not to fish, this clearly affects the number of vessels and crew at risk and, hence, our risk measure. In some sense our measure of average daily risk over the past year (the daily moving average) will mitigate this problem, but instruments for risk are at our disposal and we use them in a two-stage least squares exercise. In addition to the two dummy variables for policy changes we include wave height and an inclement weather variable, defined as the PPR index obtained from an icing nomogram. 24 In the red king crab fishery the PPR index controls for inclement weather because vessel icing is not a significant factor within this fishery, whereas in the snow crab fishery it indicates the degree of vessel icing risk present. We hypothesize that inclement weather and vessel icing is an important determinant of risk because it reduces vessel stability and increases the probability of tipping or capsizing.
Wave height, not used in the calculation of the PPR, is also an important component of fatality risk, and we use the average daily wave height reported by the NOAA weather buoy 46035 within the BSAI. 25 The results from our first stage estimation results are contained and discussed in the Appendix, The results from the second stage regression are in Table 2 . Across both fisheries studied, the results indicate that larger vessels (indicated by the length and hold capacity variables) and more mobile vessels (indicated by vessel horsepower) earn higher daily revenues. Furthermore, as would be expected, 23 A similar discussion of this relationship was elaborated on in more detail in Jones-Lee (2004) in his theoretical model of the interaction between a developed and developing countries VSL in public policy when cross-country externalities are present. 24 The weather buoy data used in the analysis comes from station 46035. More information on this buoy can be obtained at the following link: www.ndbc.noaa.gov/station_page.php?station=46035 . The buoy data used is the closest weather buoy to the fishing grounds within the BSAI that contained consistent data for the years 1997-2007. The PPR index is a transformation of weather data (wind speed, water freezing point, air temperature, and sea water temperature) which is used to predict vessel icing. Although icing is not a factor in the red king crab fishery, we use the PPR to indicate inclement weather because it non-linearly transforms these different measures of weather. 25 I some cases buoy data were unavailable, so we let these values be zeros and included a dummy variable in the regression equal to 1 if data were missing and zero otherwise.
years with a higher ex-vessel price per a pound generate larger daily revenues. Finally, the statistically significant and positive coefficient on illustrates that in years that the spawning biomass stock (and therefore the ) was larger, the mean revenues within the fishery increased, holding all else constant (i.e., the ex-vessel price effects). All of these results are consistent with our expectations and across the two fisheries studied. On the other hand, the results for the two policy shifts differ across both fisheries.
Within the red king crab fishery daily revenues increased following the USCG Pre-Season Boarding
Program and decreased following the BCRP. However, the increased revenues following the USCG PreSeason Boarding Program cannot be attributed to the policy itself, because this time period corresponds with a time of stock recovery following the near collapse of the red king crab fishery in the early 90's.
The reduction in revenues following the BCRP can be attributed to the policy because the crew and captain shares fell from the pre-rationalization levels as the financial structure of the operations changed.
Furthermore, this coefficient is not statistically significant. Within the snow crab fishery, the reduction in revenues resulting from the USCG Pre-Season Boarding Program is capturing a time period in which the snow crab fishery was under going a sizeable restructuring following the mid-1990s. During this time period the seasons was shortened (see Figure 2) , the FTEs fell (see Figure 3 ) and the € GHL was reduced, following the high catch levels in mid-90s, and, as was the case with the red king crab fishery, does not completely reflect the impact of the policy directly. Likewise, because the BCRP time period also corresponds with a time period during which the opposite occurred, the dummy variable is capturing this fact.
The coefficient of primary interest is that on instrumented daily fatalities, € fatal tf , because it is an estimate of the marginal rate of substitution of revenue and risk within the fishery. Scaling this coefficient by the ratio of the vessel-specific daily returns to the vessel-specific expected daily fatalities, we are able to recover a daily measure of each vessel's VSL, . These can be averaged over time and vessels to produce a fleet-wide VSL, . This estimate represents an upper bound on the true VSL, because it excludes vessels that did not fish because their expected revenue was too low relative to fatality risk to fish, and, hence, their implied (and omitted) would have been relatively lower had it been observed. 26 This upper bound on the fleet-wide VSL is approximately $4.45M and $5.60M (2007 dollars) in the red king crab and snow crab fisheries respectively (see Table 2 ). The value of these estimates are greater than those reported in the transportation risk literature (Ashenfelter and Greenstone, 2004 ) but within the range reported within the general VSL literature (Viscusi, 1993) . 26 There are number of other factors that may contribute to a captain's decision to fish or not on a given day which we will control for in the sample selection correction of the VSL.
Sample Selection Model
As discussed earlier, to consistently estimate the true underlying we must account for the sample selection present in the model (Ashenfelter 2006; Ashenfelter and Greenstone 2004) . To estimate we use the observed as the dependent variable in the main equation of a Heckman (1979) sample selection model. However, to recover the inverse mills ratio we must first estimate the probability that a captain decides to fish on a given day. The following probit model is estimated to recover this probability: 
€
Strike tf is a binary variable indicating whether or not the fishermen were striking due to failed price negotiations with the processors. 27 Within this research we define a "trip" by the union of all fish tickets that have overlapping dates declared. This method does result in a few "long" trips being constructed but for the most part our trip lengths correspond with information obtained from industry experts. See Appendix A.1 for more detail. 28 Dead loss results when crab have been kept in the hold for too long and they begin to perish and release chemicals that compromise the health of the other crab kept in the live hold. Given that dead crab is valueless, dead loss can substantially reduce a vessel's revenues. Red king crab and snow crab both possess different tolerances for being held in the live hold. Our dock-side interviews revealed that red king crab can live in the hold for a little over a week, whereas snow crab can nearly double that time.
Strikes readily occurred during the pre-BCRP period within the snow crab fishery, but were not prevalent in the red king crab fishery. Therefore, this variable is not used in the probit regression for the red king crab fishery. The main equation estimated is,
where all variables are as defined earlier except for € no _ weather which is dummy variable indicating whether or not weather data was missing that day within the fishery and is the inverse mills ratio (IMR). The empirical results from the Heckman model are in Table 3 . The top panel is the probit equation and the bottom panel is the main equation.
Parameter estimates for the determinants of a captain's decision to fish or not on a given day are contained in the upper panel of Table 3 . Within the red king crab fishery the probability that a captain decides to fish on a given day is increasing in the daily-expected revenues, the length of time a vessel has been at sea, and the amount of quota they have remaining. The only statistically significant factor that decreases the probability a captain will fish on given day in the red king crab fishery is the dummy variable for the post-BCRP era. Within the snow crab fishery the probability a captain elects to fish is increasing in the daily-expected revenues, the post-USCG era and length of time a vessel has been at sea.
The probability decreases in the post-BCRP era, in the remaining quota a vessel possesses and the presence of a price strike in the pre-BCRP period. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on expected revenues conforms with our a priori expectations that fishermen will elect to fish if they expect to earn higher revenues. The negative and statistically significant coefficient on the post-BCRP period, captures one of the important features of the BCRP in that fishermen can be more flexible in their fishing time decisions and the fact that vessels often take multiple trips with a higher rate of intermediate down time than prior to the BCRP. The positive coefficient on days fished indicates that a fishing vessel which is currently at sea is more likely to stay at sea. However, this variable is not statistically significant. In our preliminary regression analysis we experimented with utilizing the squared term of days fished as well to account for curvature in a vessel's response to days fished but we were unable to obtain reliable parameter estimates due to multicollinearity. The parameter estimate which does not necessarily conform with our a priori expectation is the negative and statistically significant coefficient on quota within the snow crab fishery. However, this parameter estimate can be explained due to the differences between the timing of the red king crab and snow crab fishery. Nearly all of the red king crab fishing activity begins on the opening day of October 15 th , whereas the snow crab fishery begins much more gradually following the holiday season. Prior to the BCPR there was no flexibility in the season opening, but following the BCRP fishermen in the snow crab fishery had much more flexibility in their season timing. The negative coefficient captures the fact that early in the season many vessels delayed their fishing activity and began about a week or so after the holiday season where a small number of vessels elected to fish right after the holidays.
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The estimates of equation 4, ( Table 3 , lower panel), indicate that our daily measure of the VSL is positively influenced by expected daily revenues in both fisheries. This result would be expected because if one holds the fatality risk rate constant and the economic returns per an expected fatality increasing then so will the VSL. This result is consistent with the VSL literature on developing nations where it has been found that countries with higher earnings also possess a higher measure of the VSL (Bowland and Beghin 2001; Gibson et al. 2007 ). The two policy variables, USCG and the BCRP, have the same effect on the VSL in both fisheries. In the post-USCG era the VSL estimate was larger because during this time period the percentage of gross revenues received by the captain and crew was greater than in the post-BCRP, which also explains the negative coefficient for the post-BCRP period. Given this information, if one holds the fatality risk constant the VSL would be higher in the post-USCG period and lower in the post-BCRP period which is consistent with our coefficient estimates. One other factor that increases the VSL in the post-USCG period, and also further exacerbates the decrease in the post-BCRP period, is the fact that the fatality risk rate substantially decreased following the USCG Pre-Season Boarding Program.
The weather variables used to proxy for the degree of risk on a given day illustrate that the wave height had a positive and statistically significant effect on the VSL estimates in the snow crab fishery whereas it has a negative and statistically significant effect in the red king crab fishery. The PPR has a negative effect on the VSL estimates in both fisheries, yet is only statistically significant in the snow crab fishery.
Finally, the statistically significant coefficient on the inverse mills ratio for both fisheries indicates that sample selection is an issue in our initial estimates of the VSL.
The sample selection corrected measure of the VSL, denoted in Table 3 , are lower than our earlier estimates, which would be expected given the presence of our sample selection bias because our initial estimates of the VSL are an upper bound on the true underlying VSL. Our estimates of within the snow crab fishery are "better" estimates of the VSL and indicate that the VSL is approximately $4.86M, which is approximately 13% lower than our estimates of in this fishery. Within the red king crab fishery our estimates of are approximately $4.20M, which is roughly 6% lower than our estimates in this fishery. In addition to our estimates of within these fisheries, which are averages across the population of participating fishermen, we also observe individual vessel-specific measures of the VSL as well. Figure 4 illustrates the vessel specific measures of non-sample selected corrected measures of the VSL, denoted , and the sample selection corrected measures of the VSL, denoted , sorted from the lowest measure of to the highest for both fisheries. The sample selection model reduces high estimates (right side of the Figure) and increases those estimates, which were too low (left side of the Figure) . However, by and large, the estimates predominately lie along our mean estimates of Table 3 .
Heterogeneous VSL Estimation
Heterogeneity in fishing behavior has been well documented in the literature. Commercial fishermen exhibit heterogeneous spatial behavior (Smith 2005; Haynie et al. 2008) , production methods (FloresLagunes et al. 2007; Felthoven et al. in press) , and risk perceptions (Mistean and Strand 2000) . Given the prevalence of preference heterogeneity in commercial fisheries, especially with regard to risk preferences, it is plausible that there exists heterogeneity in the captain's willingness to substitute revenues for risk, and hence heterogeneous VSLs, within the two crab fisheries studied. This could be generated by either their misperceptions regarding the underlying risk (Viscusi 1990 ), or direct differences in their preferences, the latter manifesting itself in heterogeneous marginal rates of substitution for risk and returns. Therefore, it is important that we consider latent heterogeneity within our analysis. Furthermore, it has recently been theoretically demonstrated that failing to control for heterogeneity in an agent's ability to deal with work-related risk will bias the VSL estimates upward (Shogren and Stamland 2002) . Using a finite mixture model (Aitken and Rubin 1985; Swait 1994; MacLachlan and Peel 2000) to estimate , we will control for this form of latent heterogeneity in our analysis.
The finite mixture model generalizes our reduced form expression of the revenue equation function, equation (1), by relaxing the assumption that is a constant behavioral parameter across all fishermen. Instead we estimate different segment-specific behavioral parameters, denoted € β 0| j ,..,β 10| j . We also estimate the probability that the behavior of fisherman participating in fishery € f can be represented by the set of coefficients, denoted , . Assuming a standard logit probability function, we have
with fishermen-specific observation vector, , and segment-specific participation coefficients, .
Given the high degree of heterogeneity in the vessel characteristics, we include a measure of vesselspecific capital structure, the vessel's gross-registered tonnage (
. In addition, we include a segment-specific constant and a variable indicating whether or not a vessel fished in the post-BCRP time period, denoted . This last variable will serve to proxy for the latent ability of fishermen to cope with the risks present within the BSAI. Vessels which fished in the post-BCRP likely did so because they were the most efficient vessels and, in turn, could afford to pay other vessels for the right to land their quota. Although production efficiency would increase the probability that a vessel fished rather than leasing their quota to the cooperative and sitting idle, its ability to cope with the risks in the fishery would presumably also increase their probability of being selected. A vessel which is more stable in bad weather and better suited to cope with the prevailing weather conditions will be more desirable to fish than one which is instable. Given the probability statement in equation (5) the full likelihood function for the equation (1) with heterogeneous vessels is,
where denotes total daily observations for fishermen , is the total number of fishermen in the dataset, and is the revenue function in equation (1) model and then increasing the number of segments until the test statistics unilaterally indicated that the previous number of segments was the best. The test results are in Table 4 and indicate that the best model specification is for both the red king crab and snow crab fisheries.
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30 For both fisheries we were unable to obtain reliable estimates when we assumed J=3 because both models generated a third segment with extremely low probabilities of participation for each vessel (less than 0.00001 for all
Given the multi-stage nature of our empirical model we estimate the finite mixture regression for only equation (1) (after instrumenting fatality rates). Equation (1) is the most important stage of the model because it determines the upper bound on our estimates of the VSL and is the obvious place to control for vessel heterogeneity. The sample selection portion of the model is used to uncover the true underlying VSL and is therefore preserved except for one aspect of the model. In equation (4) the constant is broken down into the respective segments by using the probability of segment participation predicted by our parameter estimates in equation (5) as independent variables in the model. The finite mixture model results for the red king crab and snow crab fisheries are in Tables 5 and   6 respectively. For both fisheries, the segment participation probabilities have been normalized on segment one, therefore we do not report parameter estimates for . Within the red king crab fishery the probability that a vessel exhibits behavior consistent with segment 2 decreases with their fixed capital structure (gross-tonnage) and increases if they participated in the fishery following the BCRP. Within the snow crab fishery the probability a vessel is within segment is decreasing in the fixed capital structure as well as a vessel's participation in the fishery following the BCRP. One important feature of the finite mixture model is that it does not precisely partition the vessels into either segment one or two. Instead, each vessel possesses an estimated probability of being in both segments,
The vessel specific behavioral parameters can be recovered by multiplying their vessel specific segment probabilities by the estimated behavioral parameter and summing over the segments. This allows us to recover vessel specific measures of the marginal rate of substitution for risk and returns within both fisheries. Each vessels marginal rate of substitution was calculated as follows,
which is used to estimate the vessel-specific, finite mixture (FM) measures of
FM , the dependent variable in the sample selection model of equation 4. Figure 5 illustrates the finite mixture model estimates of . From this figure it is evident that the homogeneous model, , under-estimates the marginal rate of substitution within the red king crab fishery and overestimates it within the snow crab fishery.
Parameter estimates for segment 2 within the red king crab fishery and segment 1 within the snow crab fishery are consistent with those observed under when we assume homogeneous preferences, € J = 1, vessels) which made it impossible to invert the hessian and obtain reliable parameter estimates. In essence, the J=3 model was degenerating to a J=2 model. This also further supported our decision to stop at J=2 in the analysis.
contained in Table 4 . The variable of primary interest is the vessel specific measure of the marginal rate of substitution. Given the differences in our estimates of across the segments in both fisheries, we would expect our estimates of the VSL in the red king crab fishery to increase relative to the homogeneous model, , and decrease within the snow crab fishery. This is precisely what we observe. The finite mixture (FM) estimates of , denoted in Tables 7 and 8 , are 7% greater than those in Table 2 for the red king crab fishery ($4.77M) and 7% less within the snow crab fishery ($5.23M). This indicates that our initial estimates within the red king crab fishery was biased downward and those within the snow crab fishery were biased upward. Furthermore, these results persist when we correct for sample selection, resulting in our VSL estimate denoted in Table 7 of $4.23M and $4.38M for the red king crab and snow crab fisheries respectively.
These finite mixture results suggest that there is a bias when assuming a homogeneous preference model, , relative to a model in which we account for latent heterogeneity. However, only the biases observed in the snow crab fishery are consistent with Shogren and Stamland's (2002) theoretical result that ignoring heterogeneity will bias our estimates of the VSL upward, whereas in the red king crab fishery ignoring heterogeneity biases them downward. This said, our notion of heterogeneity does not perfectly correlate with Shogren and Stamland's argument, which may explain the difference. Although further elaboration is beyond the scope of this research, future research on this form of heterogeneity may benefit from using Shogren and Stamland's GMM estimation algorithm to control for heterogeneity (Shogren and Stamland 2006) .
Intra-Vessel Comparison of
Estimating a vessel-and fishery-specific VSL allows us to conduct an intra-vessel comparison of their estimated across fisheries. To best of our knowledge this type of analysis has never been conducted. This is most likely due to fact that conducting an intra-population comparison within the general labor market requires tracking an individual as they move from one occupation to another and then estimating the implied VSL in both environments, controlling for all other factors that may contribute to their occupational decisions. This would be inherently problematic and subject to an omitted variable bias, because one would have to control for changes in a workers' life stages which may be very difficult. In our sample, this is not an issue because for a sub-sample of the vessels in our data we directly observe them fishing in one fishery and only a few months later (almost contemporaneously) fishing in the other.
Furthermore, the switching between fisheries occurs repeatedly over the time period studied. Comparing our vessel specific estimates of € V i FM * , across both fisheries allows us to investigate whether or not the implicit tradeoffs these fishermen are making are constant across fisheries (occupations).
There are 264 vessels that participated in both the red king crab and snow crab fisheries within our data. Figure 7 illustrates the mean vessel-specific VSL estimates for both fisheries as well as 95%
confidence intervals with the vessels ordered from the lowest to highest VSL measures in the red king crab fishery. The 95% confidence intervals were constructed by calculating the vessel-specific standard deviations in their daily VSL estimates within both fisheries. The average percentage difference between the vessel-specific VSL estimates in the red king crab fishery from their VSL estimate within the snow crab fishery is approximately -15%. Furthermore, conducting a t-test of distributional equivalence at the vessel level indicates that for roughly 92% of the vessels their two measures of the VSL are not statistically different from each other.
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These results are remarkable and novel, because the average daily revenues within the snow crab fishery are roughly half of those in the red king crab fishery and the daily fatality risk rates are substantially higher due to the time period when this fishery is executed. Both of these factors would generate a lower VSL estimate in the snow crab fishery were the marginal rate of substitution constant across both fisheries. However, the differences in the marginal rates of substitution correct for this difference in the earnings-risk ratio and generate a similar profile of intra-vessel VSL estimates. This indicates that the behavior of captains is remarkable consistent across the two risk-return profiles, providing the first ever intra-agent test of VSL stability.
Focusing on the total population, the mean dollar difference (including both positive and negative deviations) across fishermen was roughly $1.43M, which further illustrates the consistency in their behavior given that average daily standard deviation in the VSL was $2.05M in the red king crab fishery and $1.72M in the snow crab fishery for the 264 vessels that participated in both fisheries. However, these standard deviations do highlight the fact that our estimates contained in Tables 2-7 are population averages of individual averages. The full range of our VSL estimates contains a roughly $2M upper and lower bound confidence interval on our estimates. This suggests that our estimates range anywhere from slightly over $2M to slightly over $6M across all vessels and days within the data set.
IV. Conclusions
This research estimates the VSL for one of the riskiest occupations, which has recently been popularized as "The Deadliest Catch" by the Discovery Channel's reality TV show. Using two recent policy changes within the BSAI crab fisheries as well as weather data, we instrument for the endogenous daily risk present and investigate the structural breaks in the risk profile resulting from these policies.
Our estimates of the VSL range from $3.86M to $4.81M depending on the modeling assumptions and fishery studied. These estimates control for the inherent sample selection bias present in many VSL estimates and, when compared to those estimates which do not control for sample selection, illustrate the substantially upward biases which may arise (Ashenfelter 2006) . In addition, these estimates are robust to heterogeneous preferences that bias our homogeneous estimates of the VSL in both fisheries, but in opposite directions. Conducting an intra-agent analysis of our VSL across the two fisheries studied illustrates that our estimates are remarkably stable and not statistically significant form one another for roughly 92% of the population. Combined this analysis conducts the first risk-return trade off study of agent behavior in a high risk natural resource extraction industry as well as the first intra-agent comparison of VSL estimates.
More generally these results illustrate that fishermen participating in the Alaskan crab fisheries make strikingly similar decision to those observed by the greater population. This suggests that these fishermen are no more riskier than the average decision maker traditionally modeled in the VSL literature.
Although more research is required to confirm this conjecture, it does correspond with our perception of the fishermen we interviewed while conducting this research. Furthermore, these estimates may be used to benefit contemporary fisheries policy. For instance, recently the New York Times reported that the fatality rates within the Pacific Northwest dungeness crab fisheries possessed fatality risk rates that were 60 times greater than the average American worker (New York Times 2008). As a result of this managers are looking into the option of increasing the coverage of their vessel safety inspections to decrease the fatalities observed in this fishery. Our estimates of the VSL could be used to evaluate the efficacy of this policy. In our future research we anticipate investigating the asymmetry in the biases associated ignoring heterogeneous preferences within these two fisheries as well as exploring other unique features of the data set that we believe will further forward our knowledge of risk behavior within this environment as well as expanding our analysis to help inform future fisheries policy. Tables  Table 1 a The VSL measures was calculated by setting the coefficient on fatalities equal to zero for segment 1 because it was not statistically significant). Figure 6: Intra-vessel comparison of the VSL estimates using the finite mixture results. Data ordered from lowest VSL in the red king crab fishery to the highest VSL estimated: rkc -denotes red king crab fishery; rkc CI -denote 95% confidence interval on the vessel-specific VSL estimates in the red king crab fishery; snow -denotes snow crab fishery; snow CI -denotes 95% confidence interval on the vessel-specific VSL estimates in the snow crab fishery. Breaking the imputations down by pre-and post-BCRP was necessary because crew remuneration substantially changed following the BCRP. In addition, trip lengths in the years following the BCRP were longer and for a number of trips we used data from the vessel monitoring systems (VMSs) that were recently (2005-present) placed on these vessels to confirm trip lengths whenever the length exceed 18 days. If it was deemed that a vessel had returned to port to during this time period the day was treated a non-fishing day. This verification was conducted on 47 trips in the red king crab fishery and 77 trips in the snow crab fishery during the post-BCRP period. In addition, all revenues were scaled up to 2007 dollars using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
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€ price itf : The per pound price of landed crab. This was obtained from the Alaskan fish ticket database.
In addition, all prices were scaled up to 2007 dollars using the CPI. (** indicates statistical significance at the 95% level, *indicates statistical significance at the 90% level. a the dummy variable for the year following the USCG in the snow crab fishery was removed because the instruments it generated created a colinearity problem with other variables in Equation 1.)
